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Abstract—RFID has been regarded as a time and money-saving solution 
for a wide variety of applications, such as manufacturing, supply chain 
management, and inventory control, etc. However, there are some 
security problems on RFID in the product managements. The most 
concerned issues are the tracking and the location privacy. Numerous 
scholars tried to solve these problems, but their proposals do not include 
the after-sales service. In this paper, we propose a purchase and 
after-sales service RFID scheme for shopping mall. The location privacy, 
confidentiality, data integrity, and some security protection are hold in 
this propose mechanism. 
Keywords- RFID; security;  tracking;  purchasing behavior;  
after-sales service 
 
1. Introduction 
RFID has been regarded as a time and money-saving solution for a wide variety 
of applications, such as manufacturing, supply chain management, and inventory 
control, etc. However, there are some security problems on RFID in the product 
managements. The most concerned issues are the tracking and the location privacy.  
According to John Ayoade‟s definition [1], location threat is placing covert 
readers at specific locations creates two types of privacy threats. First, individuals 
carrying unique tags can be monitored and their location revealed if the monitoring 
agency knows the tags associated with those individuals. Second, a tagged object‟s 
location – regardless of who (or what) is carrying it – is susceptible to unauthorized 
disclosure. According above definition, it‟s possible that the carried tag is activated 
for someone‟s location can be targeted according to the unique tag ID in clothing or 
shoes. Moreover, activating tag could also raise some customer‟s privacy problems. 
For example, consumer‟s medications and other contents of a pocket could be 
readable and the amount of money in a wallet might be easily calculable by a reader. 
One woman‟s dress size could be publicly realized by any nearby readers. The 
privacy issues of RFID tags have raised recent attention in the popular press. More 
and more such kinds of negative news stories make the clothing retailer Benetton to 
withdraw plans for embedding RFID tags in its products of apparel. [2] 
The most straightforward approach to protect consumer privacy is that the shops 
would “kill” the tags of purchased goods. The killed tags are no more functional and 
never be re-activated. The most well-known example is the “kill command” specified 
by EPCglobal[5], which permits the deactivation of tags after purchasing. However, 
the kill command is too forceful and negative. The major problem after it has been 
killed is that the owners would never be able to take any advantages that might be 
provided by an RFID tag. It is an “all or nothing” privacy mechanism [14]. Supposed 
a tag is deactivated, it can never be used for after-sale purposes, no matter how useful 
and interesting they would be for the consumer, such as intelligent home appliances or 
emerging applications. For example, the deactivated tag can not be used for a 
microwave oven to read cooking directions from food packages. 
Besides the kill function to disable the tag permanently, blocking tags‟ signal is 
noticed to be another fitting solution for the owner privacy protection. Ari Juels 
proposed a “blocker tag” mechanism [10] to prevent malicious attackers from locating 
the target tag. The blocker tag simulates all conceivable tag identities and feigns that 
all possible tags exist there, thus preventing the reader from identifying the tags. 
Another well-known Faraday cage approach, assumed an RFID tag could be shielded 
from surveillance by using Faraday cage, a container made of foil or metal mesh that 
is impassable by radio signals. 
However, blocking the tags‟ signal will not always be a proper solution to avoid 
the tag being tracked as it is attached to a large scale object. Applying cryptographic 
mechanisms is mainstream research in the RFID identification presently. The most 
researches could be called the “mutual authentication” model, only the authenticated 
reader can get the corresponding response for identifying the tag. A proposed research 
[3] categorized the mutual authentication model to Hash-based approach [12, 16, 17], 
probabilistic encryption approach [11], pseudonym approach [6, 15, 18], and Error 
correction codes (ECC) with secret parameters approach [3]. Furthermore, RFID 
“deactivation/activation” model is another kind of solution for against the illegal 
tracking. As the tag‟s privacy flag [9] is setting off, the tag keeps silent or just 
responds unquestioningly to all requests for non-tracking. The tag will be setting on 
under the owner‟s permission as necessary for the tag should be identifiable again. Of 
course, the flipping of privacy flag should be only controlled by some kinds of secure 
scheme. 
Considering the RFID “deactivation/activation” model is a simple and efficient 
mechanism for against the illegal tracking, we will propose how to control the privacy 
flag is flipped under the owner‟s permission. Moreover, the support of after-sales 
service is also considered in our design. It is important since the shops offer the 
after-sales service have been proved to be not only vital parts of consumers‟ 
satisfaction, but also an essential fundamental of high revenues and profit [7]. 
 
2. The secure g consumer shopping and customer service scheme 
In the total solutions of intelligent store [13, 19, 20], the store issues RFID 
membership cards, and the goods will also be embedded RFID tags for improving the 
stores‟ management. The intelligent shopping cart will be equipped the RFID reader 
for the consumer to inquire about goods‟ information by scan the attached RFID tags. 
The shopping scenarios can be referred to the figure 1: (a) The consumer uses his 
membership card to log on the shopping cart‟s reader. Then, the intelligent shopping 
cart can provide the location of goods listed in the consumer‟s shopping list. (b) As 
the goods are picked up and scanned, the corresponding information is displayed on 
the shopping cart‟s reader. (c) Since the goods in the shopping cart are pre-scanned, 
the transaction can be immediately completed. (d) After purchasing, the tags attached 
on the goods should be deactivated. 
 
      
(a) Consumer logs in                  (b) Scan the goods 
      
         (c) Check-out                        (d) Deactivate the tag 
Figure 1.  the shopping scenarios in the conceptual and experimental shops. [13, 19, 20] 
 
Now we describe how our scheme works in such environment. For making the 
transaction more secure and efficient, a shared secret is secure delivered to the 
membership card and the tags attached on the purchased goods. Based on the 
membership card is involved in our design, the purchased goods‟ tags could be 
deactivated under the consumer‟s permission. For the activation of the purchased 
goods‟ tag for the after-sales service, it is also under the owner‟s permission. We 
divide our scheme into three phases: shopping phase, de-activate in purchasing phase, 
and activate in after-sales service phase. There are four roles involved in our scheme 
as follows. 
(1)Server 
The server is not only the goods database but also the tag management center. 
(2)RFID reader 
RFID readers are set up at after-sales service center of the shopping mall. RFID 
readers are also set up in each intelligent shopping cart. 
(3)Membership card with embedded RFID tag (m- type tag) 
The membership card embedded a RFID tag is issued by the shopping mall for 
each member. 
(4)RFID tag attached to goods (g-type tag) 
  The goods in the shopping mall should be embedded with RFID tags.  
 
 
 
The notations of our proposal are listed as follows.  
()h  One-way hash function 
  Exclusive-or 
pk  The server‟s public key 
sk  The server‟s private key 
()xE  The encryption function with key x 
()xD  The decryption function with key x 
xiK  
Secret key of the RFID tag, ciK  means the m-type tag‟s secret key, giK  means the g-type 
tag‟s secret key. 
xiT  
Encrypted secret key )( xipkxi KET  , ciT  means the m-type tag‟s encrypted key, giT  means 
the g-type tag‟s encrypted key. 
cgK  
The deactivate/activate key is generated by the m-type tag for deactivating/activating the 
g-type tag for each transaction. 
ie  The secret seed is recorded in the m-type tag for the deactivate/activate key‟s generation. 
jD  
The transaction time is another factor for generating the deactivate/activate key in each 
transaction. 
w  
The shopping token is randomly generated by the server for the authenticated m-type tag and 
g-type tags. It is the share secret between the m-type tag and the g-type tags in the shopping. 
in  The shopping pseudonym is randomly generated by the server for the authenticated user. 
gV  
The signed receipt includes serial number of the shopping mall, goods‟ price, transaction time 
and the signature of above messages. 
 
2.1 Shopping phase 
For a RFID-equipped shopping cart is used by a consumer, it can be also used 
for authenticating the consumer‟s identity and inquiring the RFID-tagged goods‟ 
information. In our scheme, the m-type tag and g-type tag have the same 
authentication process. After the verification, all of the m-type tag and the g-type tags 
get a common shopping-token. Besides, the m-type tag also gets a pseudonym for this 
transaction and the g-type tag acquires a signed receipt, respectively. 
Step 1:The reader generates a random number 1  and sends it to the m-type tag. 
Step 2: As the tag receiving the random number 1 , it generates the response value   
by the secret key xiK : 
),( 1 xiKh  
Then the tag generates a random number 2  and sends it to the reader with 
encrypted secret key xiT and the response value  . 
 
Step 3:Upon receiving the above messages, the reader forwards the messages 
),,( 2vT ix  to the server. And the server uses its secret key sk  to derive and 
verify the tag‟s secret key 'xiK . 
)('
xiskxi
TDK   
),(
1
'
?

xi
Kh  
After the tag is authenticated, the server randomly generates a shopping token
w , and both of the new key "
xi
K  and the new encrypted key "
xi
T  are updated. 
)( '"
xixi
KhK   
)( '"
xipkxi
KET   
For the shopping token w , the new key of the tag 'xiK , and the new encrypted 
key can be secure transmitted, the following messages ),( 11   are generated. 
)||||(),( ""
21 xixixi
TKwKh    
),,,(
2
""
1

xixi
TKwh  
According to the tag‟s type, the following process of this step can be divided 
into two cases: 
(1) m-type tag: 
The server generates a shopping pseudonym in and records it. For the 
pseudonym in  can be secure transmitted, the following message 
),( 22  is generated. 
inwh  ),( 22   
),( 22 rnh i  
(2) g-type tag: 
The server generates a singed receipt. For the purpose of making the 
singed receipt gV  can be secure transmitted, the following message 
),( 22  is generated. 
gVwh  ),( 22   
),( 22  gVh  
Afterward, the message ),,,( 2211  is sent to the tag through the reader. 
 
Step 4: As the tag receiving above message, the shopping token w , the new key of 
the tag '"
xi
K , and the new encrypted key '"
xi
T  can be derived and verified as 
follows. 
),()||||(
21
'"'"' 
xixixi
KhTKw   
),,,(
2
""'
?
1

xixi
TKwh  
Then the temporary shopping token 'w , the new secret key "'xiK  and the new 
encrypted secret key "'xiT  are recorded( or updated) in the tag. 
According to the tag‟s type, the following process of this step can be divided 
into two cases: 
(1) m-type tag: 
The shopping token 'in  can be derived and verified as follows. 
),(
),(
2
'
?
2
2
'
2
'


i
i
nh
whn


 
Then the tag records the temporary shopping pseudonym 'in . 
(2) g-type tag: 
The shopping token 'gV  can be derived and verified as follows. 
),(
),(
2
?
2
2
'
2
'


g
g
Vh
whV

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Afterward, the tag records the signed receipt 'gV . 
 
 
2.2 Purchasing phase 
After purchasing, for protecting the location privacy of the consumer, all of the 
g-type tags should be deactivated. The deactivate/activate key is determined by the 
m-type tag and secure transmitted to the g-type tag. In particularly, the 
deactivate/activate key is not necessary to be recorded in the m-type tag in our design. 
It will be practical to be implemented on the kinds of memory limited RFID tag. 
Step 1:The reader sends a query message to the m-type tag. 
Step 2:The m-type tag generates a random number 1  and sends to the reader with 
the shopping pseudonym in . 
Step 3:Upon receiving above messages, the reader forwards them to the server. 
According to the shopping pseudonym in , the server confirms this transaction 
is processed for which consumer. The corresponding secret key ciK  is 
retrieved from the database. The transaction time jD  will be secure 
transmitted to the m-type tag by the following message ),( 11  . 
jci DKh  ),( 11                                     
),( 11  jDh                                        
The server also generates a random number 2 . The messages ),( 11   and the 
random number 2  are forwarded to the m-type tag through the reader. 
 
Step 4: As the m-type tag receiving above messages, the transaction time 'jD  can be 
derived and verified as follows. 
),( 11
'  cij KhD                                     
),( 1
'
?
1  jDh                                         
According to the transaction time 'jD , the m-type tag uses its secret seed ie  
to generate the deactivate/activate key cgK . 
),( 'jicg DehK                                         
Now, the following message ),(   is prepared for transmitting the 
deactivate/activate key cgK  and the transaction time 
'
jD  to the g-type tags 
secretly, the m-type tag uses the shopping token w  to generate them as 
follows. 
)| |( 'jcg DKw  
),,( 2
'  jcg DKh  
For the integrity of the messages ),(  can be verified by the reader, the 
following messages ),( 22  are generated. 
)| |(),( 22   ciKh  
),,( 22  h  
Then the m-type tag emits the messages ),( 22   to the reader. 
 
Step 5: Upon receiving above messages, the reader forwards them to the server. Then 
the messages )| |( ''   can be derived and verified as follows. 
),()| |( 22
''  ciKh                                
),,( 2
''
?
2  h                                      
Then the messages ),( ''  and the random number 2 should be broadcasted to 
the g-type tags in the shopping cart. 
 
Step 6:As a g-type tag receiving the messages, the deactivate/activate key 'cgK  and 
the transaction time ''jD can be derived and verified as follows. 
wDK jcg 
'"' )| |(   
),,( 2
"'
?
'  jcg DKh                                                                           
After the deactivate/activate key 'cgK  and the transaction time 
"
jD are 
recorded, the g-type tag deactivates itself. 
 
2.3 After-sales service phase 
For getting after-sales service, the g-type tag should be activated and verified. 
The procedure is taken by the cooperation of the corresponding m-type tag which has 
the ability to generate the deactivate/activate key.  
Step1.The reader sends a query message to the g-type tag. 
Step2.Under deactivated status, the g-type tag just response the non-characteristic 
value jD  and a random number 1  to the reader. 
Step3.Upon receiving above messages, the reader forwards them to the m-type tag. 
Step4: According to the value jD , the m-type tag uses its secret seed ie  to generate 
the deactivate/activate key cgK . 
),( jicg DehK                                       
According to the challenging message 1 , the response   for the g-type tag 
can be generated as follows. 
),( 1 cgKh  
For the response  can be secure transmitted, the following message 
),( 11  is generated. 
  ),( 11 ciKh                                   
),( 11  h                                                      
Another response value 1  is necessary to be generated for authentication. 
),( 11  ciKh         
Afterward, the m-type tag generates a random number 2  and sends it to the 
reader with the encrypted key ciT , the response 1 , and the messages )( 1,1  . 
 
Step 5:Upon receiving above messages, the reader forwards them to the server. And 
the server uses its secret key sk  to derive and verify the m-type‟s secret key 
'
ciK .  
)(' ciskci TDK                                       
),( 1
'
?
1  ciKh                                       
After the m-type tag is authenticated, both of the new key 'xiK  and the new 
encrypted key 'xiT  are updated. 
)(' cici KhK                                        
)( '' cipkci KET                                       
Now, the server will derive and verify the response '  for the g-type tag as 
follows. 
11
' ),(   ciKh                                    
),( 1
'
?
1  h                                       
      Then the response '  is forwarded to the g-type tag by the reader. 
 
Step 6: As the g-type tag receiving the response message, it can be verified by the 
recorded deactivate/activate key cgK  as follows. 
),( 1
?
'  cgKh                                   
Based on the response message is confirmed with embedded the 
corresponding deactivate/activate key, the g-type tag activates itself. 
Now, the g-type tag will generate the response 2  for authentication. 
),( 12 rKh gi  
The g-type tag emits the encrypted key giT , the response value 2  and the 
signed receipt 
gV  to the reader. 
 
Step 7:Upon receiving above messages, the reader forwards the messages to the server. 
And the server uses its secret key sk  to derive and verify the g-type tag‟s 
secret key 'giK .  
)(' giskgi TDK                                       
),( 1
'
?
2  giKh                                     
After the g-type tag is authenticated, the after-sales service should be provided 
as it is within the warranty period that can be proved by the signed receipt gV .  
For finalizing this session, the new secret key 'ciK  and the new encrypted key 
'
ciT  which generated in step 5 should be also updated in the m-type tag. The 
following acknowledgment messages ),( 22  are generated. 
)| |(),( ''22 cicici TKKh                                 
),,( 2
''
2  cici TKh     
Then the messages ),( 22   are forwarded to the m-type tag by the reader. 
 
Step 8:As the m-type tag receiving above message, the new secret key 'ciK , and the 
new encrypted key 'ciT  can be derived and verified as follows. 
),()| |( 22
""  cicici KhTK                               
),,( 2
"''
?
2  cici TKh                                   
Finally, the new secret key "ciK  and the new encrypted secret key 
"
ciT are also 
updated in the m-type tag. 
 
 
 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Criteria analysis of after-sale service  
For supporting after-sales service in a RFID system, here are a few suggestive 
such applications [1, 7, 8, 10] : 
 Stores may wish products to have tags scannable if the products are returned as 
defective [10]. 
 RFID tags could carry relevant information to achieve the goal of “receipt-less” 
item returns [7, 8]. 
 A merchant may wish to scan consumers for marketing purposes [10]. 
 Products may need to scannable so they may be categorized for recycling 
purposes [10]. 
 The reactivation would require the permit of the owner of the RFID tag [1, 8].  
 
3.1.1 Stores may wish products to have tags scannable if the products are 
returned as defective.  
In our scheme, the g-type tags attached to the goods are deactivated after 
purchasing. The g-type tags can be only activated by the corresponding m-type tag as 
the goods are returned to the shop for asking after-sales service. As the m-type tag 
gets the transaction time value jD  from the g-type tag, the correct deactivate/activate 
key ),( jicg DehK   can be generating by the corresponding seed ie . 
),( 1 cgKh  
  ),( 11 ciKh  
),( 11  h  
The server will derive and verify the response   by the m-type tag‟s key ciK  
as follows. 
11),(   ciKh                                    
),( 1
?
1  h  
Then the response   is forwarded to the g-type tag by the reader, and be 
verified by the recorded deactivate/activate key cgK  as follows. 
),( 1
?
 cgKh  
Based on the response message is confirmed to be embedded with the 
corresponding deactivate/activate key which is protected by the one-way hash 
function, the g-type tag activates itself. Then the g-type tag can be scannable again. 
 
 
 
3.1.2 RFID tags could carry relevant information to achieve the goal of 
“receipt-less” item returns. 
For the purchased goods, the signed receipt gV  (which including the price, the 
shop‟s number, the transaction time, the discount, and the signature) is recorded in 
each g-type tag. As the g-type tag is activated again, the signature in the receipt can be 
verified as a “receipt-less” proof. 
 
3.1.3 A merchant may wish to scan consumers for marketing purposes. 
In our design, the m-type tag can be only scanned by the membership card issuer, 
such design will meet the requirement for merchants‟ wish to scan consumers, but 
consumers‟ privacy is guaranteed. As a m-type tag is queried by a challenge value 1 , 
it just response its encrypted key and a hash value   which is generated as follows. 
),( 1 ciKh  
The response messages 
ic
T  and   can be only useful for the membership card 
issuer. Using the correct private key sk , the issuer can authenticate the tag as follows. 
)(' ciskci TDK   
),( 1
'
?
 ciKh  
Clearly, it is meaningless as the m-type tag scanned by others to get the 
encrypted value 
ic
T  and the hash value  . 
Moreover, our scheme considers the equation from the consumer‟s point of view, 
it provides value to consumers: peace of mind, convenience, improved service. 
Therefore, to deploy such RFID mechanism should be helpful for marketing. 
 
 
 
3.1.4 Products may need to scannable so they may be categorized for recycling 
purposes.  
In our design, the g-type tags can be also used for the recycle management just 
after activating again. 
 
3.1.5 The reactivation would require the permit of the owner of the RFID tag. 
According the researches [1, 8] have discussed that the law should keep the 
shops from supervising, tracking or infringing the consumers‟ privacy. In other words, 
the reaction of the g-type tag should be only the owner desire. For ensuring g-type 
tags is activated under the owner‟s permission, the RFID membership card is involved 
in the after-sales service phase as we mentioned in section 3.1.1. Of course, the 
service staff of the shop has the responsibility to confirm the membership card is used 
by the owner. 
 
3.2 Security analysis 
In our scheme, the most concerned issue of location privacy is guaranteed. 
Besides, the general security issues such as confidentiality, data integrity, mutual 
authentication, replay attack, and non-repudiation are analysed in this section. 
 
3.2.1 Location privacy: 
In our design, the g-type tag is immediately deactivated after purchasing. For 
any query, the deactivated g-type tag just responses a non-characteristic transaction 
time jD . The value jD  is not useful for tracking the tag. It is not unique for each tag, 
since there maybe a lot of transactions happen at the same time. Therefore, those 
g-type tags carried by people will not cause the location privacy problem. 
However, may the m-type tag carried by people cause the tracking problem? The 
most facile solution to avoid disclosing the consumer‟s location is that the consumer 
put the m-type tag in a Faraday Cage wallet to block any query. However, as the 
m-type tag has to be taken out for authentication, the m-type tag‟s response has to be 
avoided being associated with the individual consumer. Based on the pseudonym 
approach is applied in the authentication, the encrypted pseudonym ciT  is not 
helpful for the attacker to understand the linkage of the m-type tag. Only the server 
can decrypt ciT  to authenticate the m-type tag. After the authentication, the 
encrypted pseudonym is updated to be )( '' cipkci KET   which is securely transmitted to 
the m-type tag for symmetric update. After the tag updating the new encrypted key 
"
ciT , the response will be different in next authentication. Therefore, the m-type tag 
will not be tracked or monitored by the attacker on the authentication process. 
 
3.2.2 Confidentiality: 
    In our scheme, the confidential messages are always under the protection of the 
one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations for transmitting. Only the target 
entity uses the corresponding secret key to derive the message. Therefore, the 
confidentiality is guaranteed in our design. 
 
3.2.3 Data integrity: 
For preventing possible malicious altering or transmission errors, the message 
integrity verification are always involved in each transmitting. Therefore, the integrity 
of the transmitted messages is guaranteed in our design. 
 
3.2.4 Mutual authentication: 
Mutual authentication refers to both entities in a communications link 
authenticate each other suitably. In RFID system, it mentions a tag authenticating 
itself to a server and vice-versa, therefore the both parties‟ identity are verified. In our 
scheme, the tag and the server can use the common secret to authenticate each other 
based on the design of twice challenge-response. For instance, in the shopping phase, 
the mutual authentication between the tag and the server is achieved according to the 
steps described in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  The authentication scenarios in the shopping phase 
Upon receiving the challenge value 1  from the server, the tag generates a 
response value   embedded with the receiving challenge and its secret key xiK  
which is a secret shared with the server. The tag‟s challenge 2  is also generated 
immediately. As the tag‟s secret key Kxi ‘ is decrypted by the server, the tag‟s response 
can be verified by the tag‟s challenge value 1  as follows. V 
?
  h (Kxi 
‘ , γ1) After, the 
server‟s response (α1, β1 ) which embedded the common secret key xiK  and the 
tag‟s challenge value 2  are generated. As the updated values ( w
’||Kxi
”||Txi
”) is derived 
by the tag, the server‟s response can be verified by the challenge value 2   as 
Step2 
2.1.Generates a challenge numberγ2 
2.2 v =h (Kxi,γ1)        
 
 
 
Tag (m-type/ g-type) 
2. Txi, v, γ2 
Step1 
Generates a challenge numberγ1 
 
Step3 
3.1 Kxi 
‘ = Dsk (Txi)             
  
Server 
3.α1, β1 
1.γ1 
follows. β1 
?
  h ( w
’, Kxi
”, Txi
” ,γ2 )   
Similarly, the mutual authentication between the m-type tag and the server is also 
achieved in the after-sales service phase. Only after the authentication, the m-type tag 
can be used by the owner to activate the g-type tags attached on the purchased goods. 
Then the activated g-type tags can be authenticated by the server for providing 
after-sales service. 
 
3.2.5 Resist replay attack: 
As a tag authenticating itself to the server, its response is generated according to 
the random challenge determined by the server. For instance, in the step 2 of the 
shopping phase, a tag generates a response value   which is included the reader‟s 
challenge value 
1
 . Clearly, the response cannot be reused by anyone for cheating the 
server. Similarly, the server has to authenticate itself to the tag, the replay attack can 
be resisted due to the authentication is also based on the design of challenge-response. 
 
3.2.6 Non-repudiation: 
In our scheme, the signed receipt is recorded in each g-type tag attached on the 
purchased goods. The price, the shop‟s identity, the purchase date, even the discounts 
are included in the receipt. With the corresponding signature is also recorded in the 
g-type tag, it cannot be denying for the goods sold by the shop. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The development of RFID-based systems is an overall trend of the world, it not 
only provides the commercial benefits of the company, but also could satisfy the 
consumers‟ requirement. For increasing the consumers‟ acceptance as applying RFID 
in the retailers, Bruce Eckfeldt[4] proposed three key points: peace of mind, consumer 
convenience, and improved service. For making consumers feel relieved in using our 
scheme, the tracking can be prevented by deactivating the tag of purchased goods. 
Consumers can enjoy the convenient service without additional burden such as extra 
devices or complicated processes in our scheme. In fact, the confirm process for 
after-sales service is improved by using more efficient “receipt-less” proof. We 
believe our design is a potential and useful scheme for improving the 
customer-service and consumer shopping experience. 
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